Jochen Peter

Little is known about children's long-term acceptance of social robots; whether different types of users exist; and what reasons children have not to use a robot. Moreover, the literature is inconclusive about how the measurement of children's robot acceptance (i.e., self-report or observational) affects the findings. We relied on both self-report and observational data from a six-wave panel study among 321 children aged eight to nine, who were given a Cozmo robot to play with at home over the course of eight weeks. Children's robot acceptance decreased over time, with the strongest drop after two to four weeks. Children rarely rejected the robot (i.e., they did not stop using it already prior to actual adoption). They rather discontinued its use after initial adoption or alternated between using and not using the robot. The competition of other toys and lacking motivation to play with Cozmo emerged as strongest reasons for not using the robot. Self-report measures captured patterns of robot acceptance well but seemed suboptimal for precise assessments of robot use.

With robots increasingly assuming social roles (e.g., assistants, companions), anthropomorphism (i.e., the cognition that an entity possesses human characteristics) plays a prominent role in human–robot interactions (HRI). However, current conceptualizations of anthropomorphism in HRI have not adequately distinguished between precursors, consequences, and dimensions of anthropomorphism. Building and elaborating on previous research, we conceptualize anthropomorphism as a form of human cognition, which centers upon the attribution of human mental capacities to a robot. Accordingly, perceptions related to a robot’s shape and movement are potential precursors of anthropomorphism, while attributions of personality and moral value to a robot are potential consequences of anthropomorphism. Arguing that multidimensional conceptualizations best reflect the conceptual facets of anthropomorphism, we propose, based on Wellman’s (1990) Theory-of-Mind (ToM) framework, that anthropomorphism in HRI consists of attributing thinking, feeling, perceiving, desiring, and choosing to a robot. We conclude by discussing applications of our conceptualization in HRI research.