Olivier Corneille

Interoception has been the subject of renewed interest over the past 2 decades. The involvement of interoception in a variety of fundamental human abilities (e.g., decision-making and emotional regulation) has led to the hypothesis that interoception is a central transdiagnostic process that causes and maintains mental disorders and physical diseases. However, interoception has been inconsistently defined and conceptualized. In the first part of this article, we argue that the widespread practice of defining interoception as the processing of signals originating from within the body and limiting it to specific physiological pathways (lamina I spinothalamic afferents) is problematic. This is because, in humans, the processing of internal states is underpinned by other physiological pathways generally assigned to the somatosensory system. In the second part, we explain that the consensual dimensions of interoception are empirically detached from existing measures, the latter of which capture loosely related phenomena. This is detrimental to the replicability of findings across measures and the validity of interpretations. In the general discussion, we discuss the main insights of the current analysis and suggest a more refined way to define interoception in humans and conceptualize its underlying dimensions.