Alexander C. Furnas

We examine the strategic use of contract and in‐house lobbyists by interest groups in response to shifting policy agendas. The role that lobbyists play in the policy process changes based on the policy agenda. Most of the time, subsystems manage small changes to public policy, rewarding actors with long‐term relationships. Organizations with a deep interest in the issue area maintain permanent lobbying presences, earning some degree of privilege over policymaking. However, when the broader macropolitical agenda lurches toward the issue, new participants become involved. New participants often lack the lobbying expertise of the in‐house lobbyists of established actors. Contract lobbyists play a critical role in providing spare capacity on‐demand, allowing participants not normally involved in subsystems to lobby. They also allow the best‐resourced actors, who may employ a long‐term lobbying presence, to further expand it when necessary. We test this theory using a new dataset of the lobbying content of 1,370,396 bill mentions in U.S. lobbying disclosure reports by 11,842 organizations from 2006 to 2016. We compare their policy agenda to that of the U.S. Congress. We find strong evidence that organizations hire contract lobbyists to respond to brief moments of agenda setting while permanent in‐house lobbyists have a more stable agenda.