Christian Winkler

Professor

Seinan Gakuin University
Country flagJapan

Research Interests

ApplyKite TwinLearns as you apply

Make your next move.

Prepare your application

Review drafts before you send them.

Explore related searches

About

Christian Winkler is a Professor at Seinan Gakuin University in Japan. His research areas include constitutional design preferences, political competition among major Japanese parties, and constitutional beliefs, as reflected in his recent articles. He employs experimental methods to explore these topics, contributing to the understanding of political systems in Japan.

Articles (3)

A rich literature links the survival of national constitutions to their legitimacy among citizens. However, most studies examine constitutions as a bundle of rights and institutions, and few test the micro-foundations of constitutional preferences explicitly. This article examines how individuals evaluate both the content and flexibility of discrete constitutional elements using a conjoint experiment in Japan. Respondents were asked to rate twenty-six hypothetical constitutions that varied randomly in their enumeration of twelve rights and institutions. We find that citizens generally prefer constitutions that enumerate more provisions, with greater weight placed on human rights than political institutions. This result largely confirms theoretical expectations from earlier work on comparative constitutional design. In addition, political factors, such as partisanship, moderate preferences on issues that have long divided progressives and conservatives in Japan, such as constraints on the military and establishing national emergency provisions. By contrast, socioeconomic characteristics such as income, age, and education do not, suggesting broad demographic consensus on the merits of distinct provisions. Importantly, we further demonstrate that citizens do not trade off constitutional detail and flexibility, as suggested by existing research. Respondents who prefer the enumeration of more provisions do not necessarily want a lower amendment hurdle to facilitate adaptation to new circumstances. Preferences about constitutional flexibility appear to be based on strategic imperatives, notably the desire to cement preferred provisions and prevent changes by future majorities.

Year:

2024

Year:

2022

Year:

2021

Collaborators (1)

Kenneth McElwain

Professor

University of Tokyo

JAPAN
View details