Christoph H. Stefes

Laws are only as good as their enforcement. International treaties are no exception. We investigate how Germany implements international wildlife protection treaties, namely the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora and the Bern Convention. We find that Germany's federal system allows for uneven enforcement of national legislation across the 16 federal states. We utilize Policy Feedback Theory as a theoretical lens to examine how federalism (re‐)produces different enforcement regimes. We rely on qualitative analysis of interviews of German street‐level bureaucrats, government officials, and NGO representatives. We find that macrolevel context impacts how institutions enforce wildlife protection policies. Particularly, Germany's federal structure permits either centralized, decentralized, or cooperative arrangements that result in differences in resources, affecting the ways bureaucrats view their roles and responsibilities. These resource and interpretive effects further feedback into the contextual structure of the federal enforcement system.