Ji Seon Yoo

This study investigates the effects of chief executive officer (CEO) turnover on myopic investment decisions and firm value. A variable for environment, social, and governance (ESG)‐washing is designed and employed as an alternative proxy for myopic investment. We find that firms with more frequent CEO turnover are more likely to engage in ESG‐washing as a form of myopic investment to meet short‐term performance goals. In addition, firms that engage in ESG‐washing report lower firm value than firms that are not involved in ESG‐washing because the lack of substantive investment accompanying these activities ultimately deteriorates firm reputation and value in return for short‐term improvement in ESG performance.

This study examines whether and to what extent each stage of evaluation by a nonprofit agency impacts donation revenue. We test the effects of the Korean evaluation agency's scoring, selection, and ratings disclosure stages on nonprofit organizations' future donations. Using a sample of Korean nonprofit organizations for 2017–2018, we find that the governance and financial performance scores constructed by the agency in the scoring stage are positively correlated with nonprofit organizations' future donations. We also find a positive correlation between selection by the agency during the selection stage and future donations to the selected organizations. Finally, we show that the star ratings disclosed by the agency in the ratings disclosure stage do not impact future donations because ratings are predicted by the governance and financial performance scores. Our results imply that the scoring and selection stages have strong positive signal effects on donors, whereas the ratings disclosure stage does not. These findings suggest that to help donors make decisions about resource contributions, external nonprofit agencies must primarily focus on improving the scoring methodology and selection criteria.