Joeri Rogelj
Research Interests
Make your next move.
Prepare your application
Review drafts before you send them.
Explore related searches
Articles (35)
Artificial Intelligence (AI) may impact greenhouse gas emissions in both positive and negative ways, yet these impacts are not represented in recent assessments of climate change mitigation. Uncertainty surrounding future AI capability and adoption, its impacts on energy systems, and limited data availability complicates the inclusion of AI impacts. We conduct an expert-led process, ascertaining plausible impacts, and quantify ranges in their magnitude to 2040. We present a new scenario framework for AI and climate change that considers interactions between AI growth, climate policy, and AI policy. We translate elicited insights into illustrative scenarios and assess their implications using an integrated assessment model. Cumulative global CO2 emissions by 2040 range from +11% above to 1.4% below a baseline without AI impacts, depending on the scale of AI growth and policy intervention. Our results highlight emissions risks and opportunities from AI and the need for explicit representation in mitigation scenarios.
Year:
2026
A lack of meaningful action in reducing greenhouse gas emissions has fuelled debate on whether global warming can still be limited to 1.5°C. In 2022, the Working Group III contribution to the Sixth Assessment Report found 97 scenarios that could limit global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels with no or limited overshoot, while 9 kept median warming projections under 1.5°C throughout the 21st century. These pathways relied on emissions reductions by 2025 that have not materialized. We show that updating the emissions and climate model calibrations to 2023, provides additional constraints on the projected warming outcomes. The window to keep warming below 1.5°C with a greater than 50% likelihood has closed. We use several approaches to show that the objective of limiting warming to 1.5°C needs to be pursued from above after a temporary overshoot. Immediate, rapid deep reductions in CO 2 emissions and non-CO 2 forcers, can still limit peak warming to around 1.7°C, and returning below 1.5°C before 2100 is attainable. Keeping peak warming as low as possible and pursuing to reverse it below 1.5°C thereafter will contain the adverse consequences of temperature overshoot and limit the scale of negative emissions required.
Year:
2026
Conventional climate scenarios omit fast-timescale human-system dynamics like policy rollback or economic shocks. The climate system's slow response to GHG emissions allows these `fast' terms to be averaged out, a simplification that obscures event-driven risks. Solar Radiation Modification (SRM) invalidates this assumption: rapid, sub-decadal climate responses couple directly to fast political and societal dynamics. This creates an analytical problem: acknowledged primary risks of SRM (termination shock, geopolitical conflict, moral hazard) cannot be resolved in smooth pathways but require an event-based perspective. To address this, we propose the Solar Radiation Modification Pathway (SRMP) framework, introducing five typologies that define governing logic for human-physical system interactions across timescales. We illustrate how SRM-driven shocks could fundamentally divert trajectories from static SSP narratives, revealing limitations in frameworks that assume fixed socio-political contexts. The SRMP framework serves as a diagnostic tool identifying what must be represented for adequate SRM risk assessment. By naming dynamics that current architectures cannot capture, it establishes minimum conditions for assessment that represents the fundamental risks of real-world SRM deployment. If SRM is evaluated primarily through idealised "best-case'' scenarios, the research community risks providing a systematically distorted evidence base for decisions that could prove irreversible.
Year:
2026
Literature estimates of natural methane emissions, particularly from wetlands, have a wide range of uncertainty. Meanwhile, few Earth System Models (ESMs) explicitly model wetlands as a potential source of methane. As a result, Simple Climate Models that aim to emulate the behaviour of ESMs have little to constrain their present and future contributions. MAGICC, as of version 7.5.3, fixed natural methane concentrations as constant after the historical period. Two studies that model wetland methane emissions over the 21st century both find a relationship between those emissions and global temperature, though disagree on the extent of this temperature sensitivity. An updated version of MAGICC has been created that uses this evidence to include a linearised representation of the relationship between wetland methane emissions and global temperature. The temperature-sensitivity parameter in this relationship has been parametrised in a way such that its distribution encompasses the uncertainty in both modelling literature and carbon budget studies, reflecting the currently high degree of uncertainty in wetlands emissions. Our results show how incorporating a temperature feedback in methane emissions leads to both higher temperature projections for all scenarios used here, and a widening of the uncertainty in global temperature response.
Year:
2025
Global warming is expected to stabilise once carbon emissions are brought down to – and remain at – zero. Reaching net zero is thus an obligatory minimum to stay below a specific temperature threshold. But not all net zero futures are created equal. Here, we present an emergent constraint on the Zero Emissions Commitment (ZEC): the additional global temperature change in a world that reaches and sustains zero carbon emissions. We build a linear regression model on a handful of predictors derived from real-world observables that can be measured prior to net zero, and validate its performance on the behaviour of Earth System Models. Applying this constraint to present day observations, we find a best estimate of carbon-only ZEC 50 of 6% cooling [19% cooling to 7% warming] for a world that instantaneously achieves and sustains zero carbon emissions. This estimate shifts if climate action wavers. A warmer planet portends a world at higher risk of extra warming under zero emissions. Conversely, the more we restrain global warming on the way to zero carbon, the more likely we are to see temperatures fall without intervention. This win-win, lose-lose relationship fortifies the benefits of staying well within the limits of the Paris Agreement.
Year:
2025
In a rapidly changing climate, evidence-based decision-making benefits from up-to-date and timely information. Here we compile monitoring datasets (published here https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15327155 Smith et al., 2025a) to produce updated estimates for key indicators of the state of the climate system: net emissions of greenhouse gases and short-lived climate forcers, greenhouse gas concentrations, radiative forcing, the Earth's energy imbalance, surface temperature changes, warming attributed to human activities, the remaining carbon budget, and estimates of global temperature extremes. This year, we additionally include indicators for sea-level rise and land precipitation change. We follow methods as closely as possible to those used in the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) Working Group One (WGI) report. The indicators show that human activities are increasing the Earth’s energy imbalance and driving faster sea-level rise compared to the AR6 assessment. For the 2015–2024 decade average, observed warming relative to 1850–1900 was 1.24 [1.11 to 1.35] °C, of which 1.23 [1.0 to 1.5] °C was human-induced. The 2024 observed record in global surface temperature (1.52°C best estimate) is well above the best estimate of human-caused warming (1.36°C). However, the 2024 observed warming can still be regarded as a typical year, considering the human induced warming level and the state of internal variability associated with the phase of El Niño and Atlantic variability. Human-induced warming has been increasing at a rate that is unprecedented in the instrumental record, reaching 0.27 [0.2–0.4] °C per decade over 2015–2024. This high rate of warming is caused by a combination of greenhouse gas emissions being at an all-time high of 53.6 ± 5.2 GtCO2e per year over the last decade (2014–2023), as well as reductions in the strength of aerosol cooling. Despite this, there is evidence that the rate of increase in CO2 emissions over the last decade has slowed compared to the 2000s, and depending on societal choices, a continued series of these annual updates over the critical 2020s decade could track decreases or increases in the rate of the climatic changes presented here.
Year:
2025
The Zero Emissions Commitment (ZEC) is understood to be the result of two evolving processes in the time after net zero: cooling due to carbon uptake by the land and ocean, and warming due to decreasing heat uptake by the ocean. The balance between these warming and cooling effects is what determines whether we can expect additional global temperature change after emissions stop, or whether zero emissions marks the point of temperature stabilisation. But are there observables prior to net zero that can predict which way this balance will fall?Using the simple climate model MAGICC, we find ZEC to be a function of a handful of variables in the years leading up to net zero: global surface temperature, carbon uptake, ocean heat uptake and effective radiative forcing. This simple regression performs well for predicting additional global temperature change 50 years after net zero, with reasonable predictability 100, 200 and 1000 years after emissions stop. We find that higher warming at net zero increases the probability of a positive ZEC. We test the predictability of this model in FAIR, and assess the agreement with ESM and EMIC results from ZECMIP. We investigate the potential for constraining ZEC using this model and observables available today.
Year:
2025
Global mitigation scenarios allocate resources in ways that align with specific climate targets under varying assumptions. These allocations inevitably raise questions of distributional justice. With scenarios becoming a major tool for global climate policy, the distributional implications of global mitigation scenarios are increasingly central to international political debates and negotiations. However, the scenario community lacks tools to systematically and transparently incorporate considerations of distributional justice in scenario development. This research addresses this gap by operationalizing philosophical concepts of distributional justice, referred to as justice patterns.The justice patterns examined in this study include Aggregate Utilitarian (core idea: everyone benefits), Egalitarian (equal outcomes for all), Prioritarian (priority to those worst-off), Sufficientarian (ensuring everyone reaches a minimum threshold), and Limitarian (ensuring no one exceeds a maximum threshold). With two concrete applications we demonstrate that these justice patterns provide a useful framework for integrating distributional justice considerations in scenario development.First, we quantify justice patterns to analyse the distributional logic of energy service access in scenarios from the AR6 database. Our findings reveal that Prioritatrian and Egalitarian patterns are the most prominent in AR6 scenarios, while Sufficientarian and Limitarian patterns remain underexplored, leaving a gap in the scenario space.Second, we introduce an open-source web application that visualizes justice patterns as idealized trajectories, allowing stakeholders to explore and express their preferences for justice patterns in varying contexts. We demonstrate the tool’s potential to guide scenario development in a small pilot study.We conclude by advocating for future scenario studies to systematically incorporate diverse justice patterns to examine potential conflicts between mitigation strategies and justice considerations. Furthermore, we recommend extending assessments beyond energy services to encompass non-material dimensions critical to socially acceptable futures, such as freedom and power. By operationalizing justice patterns, this research establishes a foundation for comprehensive scenario assessments on distributional justice and systematic stakeholder engagement.
Year:
2025
Simple climate models (SCMs) can emulate many of the trends and processes found in ESMs allowing for much faster runs, but among other trade-offs, they can be limited by what is already available in ESMs. In the case of natural methane emissions, there remains a high degree of uncertainty even among larger scale models over the next century and beyond, particularly in regards to wetlands. Many of the models which do exist show a strong linear relationship between global temperatures and methane emissions from wetlands. The simple climate model MAGICC, meanwhile, had previously not included a dynamic natural methane response. A linear model of wetlands methane as a function of global temperature was calibrated to output data from existing models and incorporated into MAGICC. This new version of MAGICC draws from a distribution of parameters in line with the wide spread of estimates available from existing models and informed by the available observational data. The C1, C2, C3, and C4 scenarios from AR6 were run through the new model, all experiencing a wider spread of projected temperatures. While many uncertainties remain in this simplified approach, this raises concerns about 2°C targets in these scenarios.
Year:
2025
Storing carbon for centuries to millennia in geological formations will be required if the world is to achieve net-zero CO2 emissions, and an even more critical feature of mitigation strategies if net negative CO2 or net-zero greenhouse gas emissions are to be achieved in order for global mean surface temperature to decline. The technical potential for carbon storage is commonly assumed to be vast, with estimates of available storage of around 10,000-40,000 Gt CO2 in the scientific literature. We reassess that assumption, providing a new spatially explicit estimation of carbon storage potential in sedimentary basins consistent with the principle of harm prevention which can help guide policy makers when updating their climate pledges and stay within safe planetary boundaries. We begin with current estimates of sedimentary basin volume and systematically apply a number of prudent, precautionary spatial and volumetric risk exclusions. These include minimum depths of ~1 km to ensure cap rock seal, maximum depths of ~2.5 km to avoid bedrock and limit potential seismic activation of deep rooted faults, areas with more than “moderate” historic seismic activity, environmental protection areas including the polar circles, offshore areas with >300m water depth based on current practices in the oil and gas industry, and built-up areas of human settlement under a high-population future scenario. Combining all of our risk spatial layers, we find that global storage potential declines from 11,314 Gt GO2 to 1,550 Gt CO2 of which 70% is onshore. We classify countries into four categories combining their historical contributions to cumulative emissions and their available prudent carbon storage potential. We find that number of countries with strong per-capita contributions to historical emissions also can potentially play a strong role in storing carbon in the future (e.g., USA, Australia, Saudi Arabia) whereas others have a strong responsibility but low storage capacity (e.g., the EU) implying the need to utilize storage outside their borders. We then compare our prudent storage potential with mitigation pathways assessed by the IPCC. We find that, if carbon storage injection rates were to be held constant at their respective levels at the time of CO2 net-zero, scenarios in line with the 1.5C limit of the Paris Agreement would allow for approximately 250 years of continued storage time, whereas scenarios with a 50% chance of limiting warming to 2C would have approximately 100 years of storage capacity remaining. However, scenarios in general tend to increase their use of storage beyond net-zero CO2 in order to counterbalance continued fossil fuel use or to draw down temperature levels beyond their peak. Extrapolating geologic storage usage forward, we find that nearly all IPCC-assessed scenarios limiting warming to 2C or less would reach our assessed planetary boundary before the year 2200. Our analysis has broad implications for national mitigation plan development and suggests a need for countries to explicitly state their plans for geologic carbon storage as they develop the next round of their Nationally Determined Contributions.
Year:
2025
Year:
2025
Year:
2025
Year:
2025
Year:
2025
Year:
2025
Year:
2025
Year:
2025
Year:
2025
Year:
2025
Year:
2025
Year:
2025
Year:
2025
Year:
2025
Year:
2025
Year:
2025
Year:
2024
Year:
2024
Year:
2024
Year:
2024
Year:
2024
Year:
2024
Year:
2024
Year:
2023
Year:
2023
Year:
2023
Collaborators (44)
Andrew Gettelman
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Luke Western
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Peter Thorne
Professor
National University of Ireland, Maynooth
Miranda Boettcher
Utrecht University
Camilla Mathison
University of Leeds
Gustaf Hugelius
Stockholm University
Friederike E.L. Otto
Professor of Climate Science
Imperial College London
Gunnar Myhre
Research Director
CICERO Center for International Climate Research
Julia Pongratz
-
Bas van Ruijven
Principal Research Scholar
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
Jarmo Kikstra
Researcher
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
Nico Wunderling
Goethe University Frankfurt
Damon Matthews
Professor
Concordia University
Wim Thiery
Professor at Vrije Universiteit Brussel
Vrije Universiteit Brussel
Norman Julius Steinert
Senior Researcher
CICERO Center for International Climate Research
Shonali Pachauri
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
Thomas Kleinen
Max Planck Institute for Meteorology
Zebedee Nicholls
Lecturer in Climate Modelling
University of Melbourne
Charlie Wilson
Professor of Energy and Climate Change
University of Oxford
Benjamin Sanderson
CICERO Center for International Climate Research
June-Yi Lee
Pusan National University
Roland Séférian
-
Aurélien Ribes
Université de Toulouse
Jeff Price
Associate Professor of Biodiversity and Climate Change
University of East Anglia
Chris Wells
University of Leeds
Bjørn H. Samset
Senior Researcher (Research Professor)
CICERO Center for International Climate Research
Lynn Helena Kaack
Assistant Professor
Hertie School
Stefan Frank
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
Jan Christoph Minx
Head of Research Group "Evidence for Climate Solutions"
University of Leeds
Iain Staffell
Senior Lecturer
Imperial College London
Carl-Friedrich Schleussner
Research Group Leader
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
Tamás Krisztin
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
Keywan Riahi
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
Alexander Nauels
Senior Research Scholar
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
Setu Pelz
Research Scholar
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
Jukka-Pekka Jalkanen
Senior researcher
Finnish Meteorological Institute
Edward A. G. Schuur
Regents' Professor
Northern Arizona University
Piers Forster
University of Leeds
Christopher Smith
Vrije Universiteit Brussel
shivika mittal
CICERO Center for International Climate Research
Andrew H. MacDougall
St. Francis Xavier University
Chris Jones
Professor
University of Bristol
Xin Lan
Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences
Guido van der Werf
Wageningen University & Research
Make your next move.
Prepare your application
Review drafts before you send them.