Mladen Berekovic

University of Lübeck
Country flagGermany

Research Interests

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Articles (11)

Year:

2027

Year:

2026

Year:

2026

Year:

2026

Year:

2026

Year:

2026

System in Package (SiP) relies on integrating different chiplets potentially involving many third-party devices and chiplet foundries. This type of advanced packaging technology opens up numerous threat scenarios, especially: (a) the inauthentic and untraceable integration of chiplets into a SiP, (b) the insecure integration of malicious chiplets, which leads to a severe impact on the SiP security in the field. The current solutions require many hardware cryptographic primitives, making them costly and power-hungry. Therefore, a new lightweight solution is needed to ensure secure chiplet integration and secure SiP operation. In this article, we deal with these problems and introduce iTrustlet , as a combination of a physical unclonable function and an authenticated encryption scheme to ensure an authenticated and traceable chiplet integration. We propose a chiplet integration protocol based on iTrustlet and a classical root-of-trust (RoT) to ensure the integrated chiplets are unaltered and unreplaced. To guarantee SiP in-field security, iTrustlet with a hardware firewall (HWF) is proposed. Their interaction leads to two security features: (i) HWF provides a SiP protection mechanism, and (ii) iTrustlet secures the update of HWF rules. In particular, we provide a multilevel solution centralized around iTrustlet , focusing on lightweightness. The implementation results show that area and power overheads are 1.24% and 1.84% in the case of FPGA and 0.49% and 1.2% for ASIC implementation.

Year:

2025

Their ubiquity and typically cost-driven design make platforms based on microcontroller units (MCUs) a preferred target for cyber attacks. While Hardware Roots of Trust (RoTs) aim to establish security services, such as confidentiality, integrity, and authentication, the abundance of mutually exclusive cryptographic algorithms taxes heavily on the MCUs’ limited resources. In the presented work, we leverage fundamental cryptographic implications to derive the necessary services from a single sponge-based algorithm’s engine coupled with a Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) for randomness. The proposed single engine can provide all required security services to build an HRoT. In particular, the sponge-based Ascon is chosen to realize Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) and hashing and, at the same time to establish all preconditions for required services like digital signatures or Message Authentication Codes (MACs). To demonstrate the practicality of our hardware RoT, we integrate it into a RISC-V-based System on Chip (SoC) as a memory-mapped peripheral. As proof of the concept, we implement the SoC on the AMD/Xilinx Artix-7 FPGA and synthesize it for the 130nm Open Source SkyWater PDK. The results show that our hardware RoT design adds 10.35% Look-Up Tables (LUTs) for the FPGA implementation and 0.76% area for the ASIC implementation. Our Ascon engine FPGA implementation incurs 2.33 $$\times $$ × less logic- and 4.48 $$\times $$ × less memory resources compared to the state-of-the-art. This hardware RoT integration hence enables cost-effective and efficient deployments for resource-constrained devices.

Year:

2025

With increasingly complex circuits and systems, the need for advanced design methodologies is growing. These methodologies shift the designers’ focus from technology-specific implementations to more abstract electronic system design (ESL). SystemC was developed to address this need. Being an open standard based on C++, SystemC facilitates hardware and software modeling across multiple levels of abstraction, with a particular emphasis on ESL. It is further enhanced by including the transaction-level modeling (TLM) layer, strengthening its capability to model communication between components, and even full-system simulators. Traditionally, SystemC/TLM has been deployed to provide hardware prototypes for software development early in the design process. However, surveys and literature reviews showing other capabilities of SystemC/TLM are scarce. Hence, it is essential to explore SystemC/TLM’s new capabilities in different domains such as in-circuit fault propagation, security assessment, and verification. In this article, we conduct a systematic mapping study (SMS) of SystemC/TLM modeling capabilities in certain research domains. We elaborate on the state-of-the-art ESL with an emphasis on SystemC/TLM-based system modeling. Subsequently, we present how such technologies can be applied to the new research domains within the field of circuit and system modeling, namely: (D.1) architecture exploration, (D.2) power estimation, (D.3) fault-injection analysis, (D.4) functional and security verification, and (D.5) side-channel analysis. This SMS highlights the advantages and disadvantages of the investigated SystemC/TLM capabilities and addresses the open challenges in these domains, concluding that SystemC/TLM offers significant potential in performance evaluation, verification, and security assessment of circuits and systems at ESL.

Year:

2025

Year:

2025

Year:

2023

Collaborators (3)

Saleh Mulhem

Research Group Leader

University of Lübeck

GERMANY
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Patrick Schmidt

Karlsruhe Institute of Technology

GERMANY
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Jürgen Becker

Professor

Karlsruhe Institute of Technology

GERMANY
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