Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell

Anti-China protests have posed challenges to China's ambition to further expand its political and economic influence globally. How does Beijing respond to anti-China protests? And how do anti-China protests affect Beijing's use of public diplomatic resources? We address these questions by examining the effect of anti-China protests on China's public diplomatic engagement across low- and middle-income countries in Asia. We argue that anti-China protests lead to an increased level of non-financial public diplomatic engagement (e.g., elite visits) as well as financial engagement through foreign aid. We further argue that the effect of anti-China protests on increasing public diplomatic engagement is contingent on regime type. This is because China takes the anti-China message from autocracies more seriously given the higher political costs of participating in public protests in autocracies. Compared to democracies, autocracies are also in a better position to use anti-China protests as a means to signal their political constraints, compelling China to invest more public diplomatic resources for the countries.

Journalism has long been presumed to serve as a check on the powerful, shedding light on wrongdoing; however, as local newspapers reach market failure, extant theory predicts corruption will go unchecked. We operationalize corruption as federal prosecutions for public corruption (PPCs), defined by the US Department of Justice as crimes involving the abuse of public trust by federal, state, and local public officials. We examine changes in the local news media ecosystems: first, whether declines in local newspaper employment and circulation are associated with changes in PPCs; and second, whether efforts to supplement watchdog journalism with nonprofit journalism might mitigate associated declines in federal PPC. Our findings suggest nonprofit interventions in failing local commercial news markets may be an important safeguard for keeping public officials accountable.