Sebastian Kohl

The long-run U-shaped patterns of economic inequality are standardly explained by basic economic trends (Piketty’s r > g), taxation policies or ‘great levellers’ such as catastrophes. This article argues that housing policy, and particularly rent control, is a neglected explanatory factor in understanding macro inequality. We hypothesize that rent control could decrease overall housing wealth, lower incomes of generally richer landlords and increase disposable incomes of generally poorer tenants. Using original long-run data for up to 16 countries (1900–2016), we show that rent controls lowered wealth-to-income ratios, top income shares, Gini coefficients, rents and rental expenditure. Overall, rent controls need to be strict in order to have tangible effects, and only the stricter historical rent controls did significantly reduce inequalities. The study argues that housing policies should generally receive more attention in understanding economic inequalities.

The Keynesian demand regime that existed until the 1970s was characterised by governments steering demand and employment through housing and infrastructure investments. By the 1980s, Western countries began to retreat from these capital-intensive subsidies and turned to the stimulation of homeownership-spreading private mortgage markets, but with three different ideal-typical trajectories until 2008. In construction-repressive countries, like Germany, growing exports were to fill the void of the withdrawing construction engine; in countries with construction booms, like Spain, the mortgage credit expansion temporarily generated another long construction cycle. Conversely, in countries with mortgage booms only, like the UK, mortgages exploded and generated more consumption, but no proportional construction output. We explain the divergence into different trajectories through a policy feedback mechanism: parties in construction (export) economies tend to favour construction (export) policies. While exports, construction and mortgages became alternative drivers of growth, all three trajectories have their downsides which surfaced post-2008 and make them inherently unstable.