Tal Avinadav

Has grant

Bar Ilan University
Country flagIsrael

Research Interests

ApplyKite TwinLearns as you apply

Make your next move.

Prepare your application

Review drafts before you send them.

Explore related searches

Recent Grants

Grant: Close

A New Approach to Business Agreement in a Supply Chain of Mobile Apps

Open Date: 2020-01-01

Close Date: 2022-12-31

Grant: Close

A Novel Approach for Efficiency Improvement of Service Systems by Performing and Storing Preliminary Services

Open Date: 2017-01-01

Close Date: 2019-12-31

Articles (11)

Year:

2026

Year:

2026

Year:

2025

Year:

2025

Year:

2025

Year:

2025

Year:

2025

Year:

2024

Year:

2024

Partial vertical ownership describes a situation in which a firm holds financial shares in either its supplier (referred to as partial backward integration) or its customer (partial forward integration). We study the effect of such financial interconnectedness on two operational decisions: capacity investment and information exchange. In our model, a retailer, who has superior information about the future market demand, has passive financial holdings in the supplier. Although this passive financial investment does not enable the retailer to directly influence the supplier’s operational decisions, it does affect the market equilibrium. Specifically, financial interconnectedness between the firms can result in the retailer financing the entire capacity in the market. In addition, we characterize the conditions that ensure that information between the retailer and the supplier can be exchanged via cheap-talk communication. Interestingly, a high level of information asymmetry facilitates the exchange of information via cheap talk in the presence of these financial links. When cheap talk is not possible, we study the separating equilibrium that is achieved through the retailer’s commitment to order in advance. In this case, the separating quantity can either increase or decrease with the level partial vertical ownership, and this trend does not depend the actual level of the financial holdings. We further analyze the incentive of the retailer to conceal demand information by choosing a pooling equilibrium and conclude with discussing the effect of the financial interconnectedness on the parties’ operational payoffs. This paper was accepted by Jayashankar Swaminathan, operations management. Funding: N. Shamir gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Israel Science Foundation [Grant 2358/22] and The Henry Crown Institute of Business Research in Israel. T. Avinadav gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Israel Science Foundation [Grant 1571/20]. Supplemental Material: Data and the electronic companion are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4673 .

Year:

2023

Year:

2023

Collaborators (2)

Tatyana Chernonog

Bar Ilan University

ISRAEL
View details

Noam Shamir

Tel Aviv University

ISRAEL
View details