Tianxiang Dai
Assistant Professor
Research Interests
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Articles (4)
Year:
2025
Servan-Schreiber et al. [IEEE S& P, 2023] presented a new notion called private access control lists (PACL) for function secret sharing (FSS), where the FSS evaluators can ensure that the FSS dealer is authorized to share the given function. Their construction relies on costly non-interactive secret-shared proofs and is not secure in the post-quantum setting. We give a construction of PACL from publicly verifiable secret sharing (PVSS) under the short integer solution (SIS) problem. Our construction adapts the Gentry et al.'s scheme [EUROCRYPT, 2022] for the post-quantum setting based on the learning with error (LWE) assumption aimed at ensuring that database access control policies are enforced by FSS evaluators, who verify that the FSS dealer is authorized to share the specified database query function. The benchmarks of our PACL show a trade-off between proving and verification efficiency, making the optimal choice dependent on application requirements. This construction has many applications for access control by applying FSS. We also present a secure data retrieval scheme using DPF-PACL for access control, which complements the PACL framework while providing independent utility.
Year:
2025
Federated learning (FL) proposes to train a global machine learning model across distributed datasets. However, the aggregation protocol as the core component in FL is vulnerable to well-studied attacks, such as inference attacks, poisoning attacks [71] and malicious participants who try to deviate from the protocol [24]. Therefore, it is crucial to achieve both malicious security and poisoning resilience from cryptographic and FL perspectives, respectively. Prior works either achieve incomplete malicious security [76], address issues by using expensive cryptographic tools [22, 59] or assume the availability of a clean dataset on the server side [32]. In this work, we propose AlphaFL, a two-server secure aggregation protocol achieving both malicious security in the universal composability (UC) framework [19] and poisoning resilience in FL (thus malicious2) against a dishonest majority. We design maliciously secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocols [24, 26, 48] and introduce an efficient input commitment protocol tolerating server-client collusion (dishonest majority). We also propose an efficient input commitment protocol for the non-collusion case (honest majority), which triples the efficiency in time and quadruples that in communication, compared to the state-of-the-art solution in MP-SPDZ [46]. To achieve poisoning resilience, we carry out 𝐿∞ and 𝐿2-Norm checks with a dynamic L_2-Norm bound by introducing a novel silent select protocol, which improves the runtime by at least two times compared to the classic select protocol. Combining these, AlphaFL achieves malicious2 security at a cost of 25% − 79% more runtime overhead than the state-of-the-art semi-malicious counterpart Elsa [76], with even less communication cost.
Year:
2025
Year:
2025
Collaborators (1)
Rüdiger Kapitza
Professor
Friedrich-Alexander Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg
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