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Articles (25)
Year:
2026
Year:
2026
Year:
2026
Year:
2026
Evaluating others’ prosocial tendencies can benefit individuals by allowing them to interact with prosocial individuals and avoid antisocial ones. The ontogeny of humans’ strong prosocial preference has been widely investigated using the hill paradigm. Infants’ preference for helper over hinderer agents was measured after they watched a scene in which the helper agent pushed a climber up a hill while the hinderer agent pushed the climber down the hill. Bonobos tested with the hill paradigm preferred the hinderer over the helper, contrasting previous findings for other nonhuman primates. In this study, we explored whether another primate species would exhibit a hinderer preference using the same procedure as the one used with bonobos. Tonkean macaques ( Macaca tonkeana ) did not prefer the helper over the hinderer (or vice versa). While the small sample size ( n = 12) and low attentional level observed in our subjects limit interpretation, this finding contributes to a broader critical thinking on the relevance of the hill paradigm to investigate prosocial preferences and on methodological limitations when testing nonhuman animals. Studies using various experimental paradigms with conspecifics or human actors as social agents are needed to further investigate the social evaluation of prosocial behaviours in primates.
Year:
2025
Higher cognition is special in that it goes beyond representing the here and now. Two relevant forms of such thinking are Theory of Mind (ToM) that enables us to represent others’ perspectives, and Mental Time Travel (MTT) that enables us to represent other points in time. The present studies investigate how these capacities are related in development. Do they build on the same cognitive foundations and thus emerge together? Do higher-order forms of the two abilities rely on analogous recursive embedding and thus progress in parallel and coordinated ways? We addressed these questions in four studies with 3- to 9-year-old children ( N = 395). ToM was operationalized as first-, second- and third-order false belief understanding. MTT was operationalized as reasoning about future possibilities (first-order), counterfactual reasoning (second-order) and anticipating counterfactual emotions (third-order). Study 1 shows a stepwise development of both ToM and MTT and a moderate consistency of performance patterns. However, across all four studies, we did not find robust correlations between first-, second- and third-order tasks of ToM and MTT, respectively. Overall, these results show stepwise and parallel trajectories in ToM and MTT, but do not provide stringent evidence for a joint cognitive foundation of the two capacities.
Year:
2025
Year:
2025
For optimal decision-making, social animals can benefit from evaluating others’ behaviours. Some species seemingly consider the skills of others when deciding who to interact with in different contexts. Yet, whether and how nonhuman animals form impressions about others’ competence is still unclear. In this study, we investigated whether Tonkean macaques ( Macaca tonkeana ) and brown capuchins ( Sapajus apella ) can evaluate the skilfulness of others. Subjects observed two human actors (one skilful, one unskilled) trying to open several food containers. Only the skilful actor successfully opened the containers and released food so the experimenter could give it to the subjects. Afterwards, subjects did not choose the skilful actor significantly more frequently than the unskilled one. Their choices for the skilful actor did not increase through trials, nor were they based on the outcomes experienced in previous trials. However, when we considered their initial preferences for the human actors, we observed a significant shift in preference for the skilful actor. Our subjects also looked preferentially at the skilful over the unskilled actor when both simultaneously manipulated a container. We observed substantial individual variation and species differences in choice and looking behaviours. While the cognitive mechanisms (impression formation vs outcome-based process) underlying these social decisions are still unclear, our findings indicate that Tonkean macaques and brown capuchins used social information about the actors’ skills to inform their decisions.
Year:
2025
Evaluating others’ prosocial tendencies can benefit individuals by allowing them to interact with prosocial individuals and avoid antisocial ones. The ontogeny of humans’ strong prosocial preference has been widely investigated using the hill paradigm. Children’s preference for helper over hinderer agents was measured after they watched a scene in which the helper agent pushed a climber up a hill while the hinderer agent pushed the climber down the hill. Bonobos tested with the hill paradigm preferred the hinderer over the helper, contrasting previous findings for other nonhuman primates. We tested Tonkean macaques ( Macaca tonkeana ) using the same procedure as the one used with bonobos to see whether they would also exhibit a hinderer preference. Subjects did not prefer the helper over the hinderer (or vice versa). The low attentional level observed in our subjects suggests a lack of interest in the video stimuli. This finding relates to more general questions regarding how animals perceive abstract animated onscreen stimuli and the relevance of the hill paradigm in investigating prosocial preferences. Studies using various experimental paradigms with conspecifics or human actors as social agents are needed to investigate further the social evaluation of prosocial behaviours in Tonkean macaques, bonobos, and other primates.
Year:
2025
One crucial form of advanced Theory of Mind that is foundational for our everyday social lives is the understanding of the subjective intentionality behind people’s actions. Intentions can be subjective in the following sense: an agent may do many things at once but which of these she does intentionally depends on the description under which she represent these acts (Anscombe, 1979; Searle, 1983). For example, a chef may simultaneously serve an exquisite dinner decorated with nuts, thereby impress the guests, while also triggering an allergic reaction in one guest – and only perform the former two intentionally (serve dinner, impress guests) but not the latter (cause allergic reaction). From a developmental perspective, a crucial question is when such complex action understanding emerges. Previous research indicated that children’s understanding of subjective intentions emerges relatively late (Kamawar & Olson, 2011; Proft et al., 2019; Schünemann, Proft, et al., 2021). The present studies investigated whether these difficulties might have been due to linguistic task demands. We developed a new task that did not require subtle linguistic understanding of complex test questions. Instead, children judged whether some behavior was brought about by an intentional action given an agent’s (false) beliefs and desires. Four-to-seven-year-olds (N = 246) participated in two preregistered studies. Despite the fact that the tasks were linguistically much simplified, we found comparable results to previous studies: Children proficiently ascribed subjective intentions only from around age 5-6 years. These results provide converging evidence for a protracted development of advanced Theory of Mind and raise questions, for future research, regarding the foundations of such developmental trajectories.
Year:
2025
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2024
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2024
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2024
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2024
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2024
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2022
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2022
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2021
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2021
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2021
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2021
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2021
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2021
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2021
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2021
Collaborators (5)
Ulf Liszkowski
-
Julia Fischer
Professor
German Primate Center
Charlotte Grosse Wiesmann
Professor
University of Technology Nuremberg
Jan M. Engelmann
University of California, Berkeley
Stefanie Keupp
German Primate Center
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