Martin Peitz
Research Interests
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Articles (21)
Year:
2026
Year:
2026
Year:
2026
Year:
2026
Year:
2026
Biased recommendations arise naturally in markets with heterogeneous consumers. We study a model in which a monopolist offers an experience good to a population of consumers with heterogeneous tastes and makes personalized purchase recommendations. We provide conditions under which a firm makes welfare‐reducing purchase recommendations with positive probability, resulting in inflated recommendations. We extend this insight to a setting in which an intermediary makes the recommendations, whereas a seller sets the retail price. Regulatory interventions that forbid inflated recommendations may lead to higher social welfare or may backfire.
Year:
2026
Year:
2026
We propose a tractable model of asymmetric platform oligopoly with logit demand in which users from two distinct groups are subject to within‐group and cross‐group network effects and decide which platform to join. We characterize the equilibrium when platforms manage user access by setting participation fees for each user group. We explore the effects of platform entry, a change of incumbent platforms' quality under free entry, and the degree of compatibility. We show how the analysis can be extended to partial user participation.
Year:
2026
Zusammenfassung Handelskonflikte, geopolitische Spannungen, digitale Disruption und Klimakrise stellen Deutschland und Europa vor große Herausforderungen. Wie beispielsweise im Draghi-Bericht gefordert, können die Staaten in Reaktion darauf industriepolitische Maßnahmen ergreifen, um die Ökonomie neu auszurichten und damit die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit zu steigern und die Resilienz zu stärken. In diesem Beitrag weisen Tomaso Duso und Martin Peitz Wege, wie sich die Wettbewerbspolitik im Blick auf industriepolitische Ziele neu ausrichten lässt. Sie präsentieren Optionen, wie Gesetzgeber und Wettbewerbsbehörden auf die aktuellen Herausforderungen reagieren, Zielkonflikte entschärfen und den Entscheidungsrahmen anpassen können. Anschließend betrachten sie Elemente einer wettbewerbsorientierten Industriepolitik, die sie als einen evidenzbasierten zielgerichteten Ansatz verstehen, in dem der Wettbewerb sowohl als Leitbild als auch als Steuerungsgröße dient.
Year:
2025
We consider a monopolist selling a product to differentially informed consumers: some consumers are uncertain about their tastes, whereas other consumers are perfectly informed. The monopolist sets a uniform price and can make personalized product recommendations. We characterize conditions under which the monopolist biases its recommendations—that is, some consumers with values below the marginal cost follow the recommendation to buy the product or some consumers with values above the marginal cost follow the recommendation not to buy the product.
Year:
2025
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2025
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2025
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2025
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2024
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2024
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2024
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2023
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2023
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2022
Year:
2020
Year:
2020
Collaborators (2)
VOLKER NOCKE
University of Mannheim
Tomaso Duso
Head of Department
German Institute for Economic Research
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