VOLKER NOCKE
Research Interests
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Articles (7)
Year:
2026
Year:
2026
Year:
2026
Using an aggregative games approach, we analyze horizontal mergers in a model of multiproduct‐firm price competition with CES and logit demand, allowing for arbitrary firm and product heterogeneity. We provide conditions under which a merger raises consumer surplus, and establish the dynamic optimality of a myopic, consumer‐surplus‐based merger approval policy. We also study the aggregate surplus and external effects of a merger. Finally, we show that the market power effect of a merger, defined as the welfare effect in the absence of merger‐specific synergies, can be approximated by the induced, naively computed change in the Herfindahl index.
Year:
2025
It is often argued that startups are acquired for the sole purpose of hiring specialized talent. We show that the goal of such acquihires might be to shut down the most relevant labor market competitor. This grants the acquirer monopsony power over specialized talent. As a consequence, acquihiring may harm employees and be socially inefficient. We explore the robustness of these effects, allowing for private benefits associated with working at a startup, varying bargaining protocols, multiple employees with and without complementarities, and private information. This paper was accepted by Maria Guadalupe, strategy. Funding: H. Bar-Isaac thanks the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for financial support. V. Nocke gratefully acknowledges support from the German Research Foundation (DFG) through CRC TR 224 [Project B03].
Year:
2025
Year:
2020
Year:
2020
Collaborators (2)
Nicolas Schutz
Professor
University of Mannheim
Martin Peitz
University of Mannheim
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